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Abstract. The article analyses the teaching of military history in the 
Estonian army in the interwar period. It argues that the basic concepts – 
the purpose, thematic distribution, teaching methods – were developed 
by the former professor of the tsarist military academy, Lt. Gen. Aleksei 
Baiov. Baiov stressed that history, along with strategy, was at the core of 
military science. However, Baiov and other Russian émigrés came under 
heavy criticism from the Estonian command, particularly Gen. Nikolai 
Reek, who thought Estonia was too small to require a school of strategy. 
In the background, there was the theoretical clash, carried over from 
the pre-war tsarist Russia, between the old generation of bayonet tac-
tics and the new generation of fire and movement. In 1926, Baiov was 
fired, but Reek’s reforms, which subordinated history to the needs of 
tactical training, remained incomplete even at the end of the 1930s. A 
number of questions about the utility and the substance of military his-
tory remained unresolved. Indeed, they are still not settled in Estonian 
officer education today. 
How should military history be studied and taught, and what is its pur-
pose? How can we transform the approach to military history so that it is 
as applicable as possible in military practice? And what part of military 
science is covered by the discipline of military history? These questions – 
which were discussed in many European countries more than 100 years 
ago – are salient in today’s Estonia.1 Even though similar discussions 
1 Igor Kopõtin, “Sõjaajaloo õpetamisest ja uurimisest Saksa Bundeswehri kogemustele toe-
tudes,” Sõdur 6 (2016): 45–49.
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were held among Estonian military historians and service personnel just 
a few years ago, consensus has not yet been forged.2 One solution, besides 
examining foreign experience, would be to take a look at the practices of 
teaching and researching military history in Estonia between the world 
wars, to understand how salient these issues were back then and what 
solutions were found in their regard. As questions of military history have 
been dealt with to some extent by other researchers,3 the task at hand now 
would be to determine how military history was seen back then and iden-
tify the principles used to teach military history in the armed services.
In 1923, Estonian military education was consolidated into a single 
institution that went by the name “Sõjaväe Ühendatud Õppeasutused” 
(United Military Educational Institutions, UMEI).4 All institutions in 
the UMEI system had their own curricula, which contained military his-
tory instruction. Historian Andres Seene has done noteworthy work in 
the study of Estonian military education. Unfortunately, while Seene’s 
research deals quite thoroughly with the activities of the Kõrgem Sõjakool 
(Officers’ School, KSK) and the Sõjaväe Tehnikakool (Military Technical 
School, STK), treatment of provision of education and various subjects at 
the Sõjakool (Military Academy, SK) is given shorter shrift.5
In the context of this article, one paper that should be considered 
important is the master’s degree thesis defended by Andero Nimmer in 
2013, which dealt with the activities of the War of Independence His-
tory Committee from 1926 to 1940.6 Regardless of the fact that Nimmer’s 
research focuses solely on the activities of the History Committee, valu-
able information can be found on how the commanding officers of the 
Estonian military viewed military history. It is important to note that 
Nimmer, at the end of the thesis, concluded that even in the early 1930s, 
2 Kaarel Piirimäe, “Sõjaajalugu – kellele ja milleks? Sõjaajaloo perspektiivid (III),” Tuna 1 
(2017): 146–148.
3 Andero Nimmer, Vabadussõja Ajaloo Komitee (1926–1940) (master’s thesis, Tartu Ülikool, 
2013).
4 The reason for the consolidation of the schools was lack of resources, especially in specia-
lists and teaching staff, Andres Seene, “Eesti ohvitseride ettevalmistamise süsteemi kujunemine 
ja areng 1919–1940” (PhD thesis: Tartu Ülikool, 2011), 41.
5 Seene, “Eesti ohvitseride.”
6 Nimmer, “Vabadussõja Ajaloo Komitee.”
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broad swathes of the officer corps did not feel a need for research on mili-
tary history, as they felt it lacked practical value for military training.7 In 
this connection, the observation by Kaarel Piirimäe – that the Estonian 
military command, and specifically Commander-in-Chief Johan Laid-
oner, did not draw the right conclusions from the War of Independence – 
seems eminently logical.8 It is not quite clear in this regard whether this 
stemmed from lack of strategic thinking on the part of the officer corps, 
in particular the high command, or whether it was shaped by the inability 
of military educational institutions to develop the capability of the offi-
cer corps to learn from military history. In any case, the present research 
should help determine the importance of the military history discipline 
within Estonian military education in general.
The Beginning of Teaching of Military History  
and the Crisis Concerning the Military History 
Paradigm
Several researchers have pointed out the significantly large role played 
by Russian émigrés in establishing the military education tradition in 
Estonia in the first half of the 1920s.9 The Higher General Staff Courses 
launched at Tondi in 1921 (and later held at the KSK) were taught by Rus-
sian émigré officers who laid the basis for the teaching of the military his-
tory discipline. An extraordinary role in this was played by a professor of 
the Imperial Nicholas General Staff Academy, the professor and military 
historian Lt. General Aleksei Baiov, who taught several different subjects 
7 Ibid., 90.
8 Kaarel Piirimäe, “Preparing for war in the 1930s: The myth of the Independence War and 
Laidoner’s ‘active defence’,” Estonian Yearbook of Military History 7, no. 13 (2017): 132–134.
9 Ago Pajur, Eesti riigikaitsepoliitika aastail 1918–1934 (Tartu: Eesti Ajalooarhiiv, 1999), 153. 
Seene, “Eesti ohvitseride,” 43. Roman Abisogomjan (Абисогомян, Роман), “Rol' russkix voen-
nyx dejatelej v obščestvennoj i kul'turnoj žizni Èstonskoj Respubliki 1920–1930-x gg i ix litera-
turnoe nasledie (Роль русских военных деятелей в общественной и культурной жизни 
Эстонской Республики 1920–1930-х гг. и их литературное наследие)” (Master’s thesis, 
Tartu Ülikool, 2007), 46–54. Igor Kopõtin, “Rahvuslus ja lojaalsus Eesti sõjaväes vähemusrah-
vuste näitel 1918–1940” (PhD thesis, Tallinna Ülikool, 2018), 239–247.
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at both the Estonian SK and for the General Staff courses. Among other 
things, he prepared the first curriculum for the General Staff courses and 
laid down the system for the organization of studies.10
In spite of the prolific research and teaching activity of the Russian 
émigrés and their professionalism, UMEI considered the use of Russians’ 
services a temporary measure in place only until they could be replaced 
by Estonian teaching staff.11 The teaching by Russian émigrés was con-
sidered outdated due to their traditional teaching methodology, and they 
were faulted for ignoring the contemporary (the Estonian War of Inde-
pendence) experience. This led to the cutting of ties with the Russian 
émigrés in 1923–1926.12 Nor were the students satisfied with the Russian 
teaching staff, and the discontent was especially felt among the officers 
who were assigned to Standing Forces Courses and had fought in the War 
10 Abisogomjan, “Rol' russkix voennyx,” 48.
11 Kopõtin, “Rahvuslus ja lojaalsus,” 243, 246.
12 Ibid., 243–244.
Aleksei Baiov, Lt. General of 
the Imperial Russian army and 
former lecturer at the Estonian 
General Staff courses. On the 
photo, taken in 1931, Baiov wears 
the fourth class of the highest 
military decoration of the Russian 
Empire, Order of St. George. 
Courtesy: Parikas, Estonian Film 
Archive
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of Independence. One of them called the era “the Russian era” character-
istic of the “general staff overtones wanting to force the development into 
a university with a grand strategy”.13
It can now be firmly asserted that the harassment of Russian émigrés 
was, among other things, justified by a policy of fighting back against 
a “Russian ethos”. The émigrés were faulted, with some justification, for 
being disloyal to the Estonian state and not proficient in Estonian.14 But 
can a generational conflict be seen here to some degree as well? The Esto-
nian military cast aside the experience of non-Estonian specialists in the 
imperial army, unlike the Red Army, where former tsarist army officers 
(including the Soviet military theoretician Aleksander Svechin, who 
was also known in the West) were given the chance to shine. For under-
standable reasons, the principles of military education followed in the 
Entente powers, above all, France, were preferred in the early 1920s, and 
an attempt was made to apply these Western ideas in Estonia as well.15 
Probably because of this, the Estonians hastened to rid themselves of the 
Russians.
The views of General Reek, who was highly influential for the 
develop ment of the Estonian military and military education and who 
believed that it was necessary to teach military history, are therefore of 
interest. In 1921, Reek was the chairman of the Military Teaching Com-
mittee and UMEI Inspector. He was considered competent to decide such 
important assignments because he had military higher education16 and 
War of Independence experience as regiment commander and division 
and frontline chief of staff.17 Yet the choice of Reek can also be considered 
proble matic, as Reek completed only short courses at the General Staff 
13 Veste, “Tondil,“ Sõdur 6–8 (1928): 328.
14 Kopõtin, “Rahvuslus ja lojaalsus,” 239–248.
15 See O.J., “Miks suundume läände,” Sõdur 9/10 (1928): 410–411.
16 Andres Seene, “Kindralleitnant Nikolai Reek ja tema sõjakirjanduslik pärand,” – Nikolai 
Reek, Sõjateaduslik testament, ed. Andres Seene (Tartu: Ilmamaa, 2015), 9–10. It is worth 
noting that the peacetime graduates of the General Staff Academy did not accept wartime 
graduates as equal, calling them “недоучки“ (half-educated) or even “недоноски” (prema-
ture babies), Andrej Ganin (Андрей Ганин), Zakat Nikolaevskoj voennoj akademii 1914–1922 
(Закат Николаевской военной академии 1914–1922) (Moskva: Knižica, 2014), 430.
17 Seene, “Eesti ohvitseride,” 41.
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Academy and other division and front staff commanders had served in 
the War of Independence as well. No doubt one reason for the appoint-
ment of Reek was the trust and authority he enjoyed among other officers 
in the 1920s. Reek’s views were supported by generals August Traksmaa 
and Juhan Tõrvand, who called Reek a progressive-minded officer.18 The 
later Colonel Elias Kasak also supported Reek’s candidacy. Still, Kasak 
admitted that Reek was a commander with a difficult personality who 
had extended the invitation for Russian émigrés to teach at the academy 
but did not create the necessary academic atmosphere at the General Staff 
Courses and levelled unfair criticism at the teaching staff.19
As one of the founders of higher military education in Estonia in 1921, 
Reek also wrote, even prior to his studies in France – citing Helmuth von 
18 Juhan Tõrvand, “Rohkem objektiivsust ja õiglast analüüsi,” Sõdur 9/10 (1928): 378–379. See 
also Elias Kasak, “Mälestusi, II osa,” RA, ERA.4996.1.125, 165.
19 Kasak, “Mälestusi,” 159.
Chief of the General Staff Nikolai Reek was always interested in military 
education. In this photo General Reek is inspecting the Officers’ School at 
Tondi, Tallinn, in 1935. Courtesy: the photo collection of Igor Kopõtin
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Moltke and John Frederich Charles Fuller – that thorough knowledge of 
military history was a key element of military education, which equal 
to tactical training had to give commanders the “instinct for mounting 
major operations”. He considered strategy and tactics the main subjects 
in military science.20 
After his studies in France, Reek developed a different view of the 
importance of military history. In an article on officers’ education pub-
lished in the magazine Sõdur in 1926, Reek declared that military history 
was subordinate to tactical education. Reek called for significant cuts to 
be made to the History of the Art of War syllabus taught at the UMEI. 
In particular, earlier parts of the history before Napoleonic wars had to 
be cut, and there had to be near total focus on World War and War of 
Independence.21 In other words, he believed general history of the art 
of war was necessary only insofar as it yielded good tactical examples. 
He saw two needs for teaching the history of the War of Independence. 
One was that the war was supposed to get officers into the habit of 
thinking and acting in the conditions of an independent Estonia, tak-
ing into account, in particular, the battlefield experience of the War of 
Independence and the use of human resources in the Estonian context.22 
 Second, the history of the War of Independence was necessary, above all, 
for training officers.23 These views probably determined Reek’s “reform” 
in military education and shaped the teaching of military history from 
that point on.
Teaching of the history of the War of Independence and the synthe-
sis of its lessons for officers were important, Reek felt, as they shaped 
the understanding of Estonia’s military strategy. But precisely this, in 
the opinion of the historian Kaarel Piirimäe, was the problem, as it led 
to key miscalculations in the future vision of war. Piirimäe notes that 
the Russian émigré teaching staff deemed the experience in the War of 
20 Nikolai Reek, “Ühise sõjalise doktriini väljatöötamise tähtsus juhtide seas,” – Sõjateaduslik 
testament, 353, 357.
21 Nikolai Reek, “Meie kaitseväe juhtiva koosseisu kasvatuse ja väljaõppe alalt,” ibid., 391.
22 Andres Seene, “Kõrgem Sõjakool 1921–1940,” KVÜÕA toimetised 9 (2008): 37.
23 Reek, “Meie kaitseväe,” 391.
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Independence specific, as an irregular amateur armed conflict.24 Although 
this opinion in retrospect seems justified, the reason that Russian émi-
gré teaching staff ’s stint at the UMEI was short-lived was because they 
did not give the War of Independence its due. Admittedly the problem 
was not unique, for just like the Estonian General Staff Courses, the Red 
Army General Staff Academy’s old-school teaching staff likewise ignored 
the experience of the Russian Civil War, considering the conflict to also 
be an anomalous war.25
The fact that the study of recent historical conflicts was preferred over 
older historical conflicts was not unusual in military education. Further-
more, there is reason to think that it stemmed from the experience of the 
Nicholas General Staff Academy. After the defeat in the Russo–Japanese 
War, the General Staff Academy was accused of the inability to provide 
students truly essential knowledge needed in war. Teaching of military 
history came under fire, as it was allegedly preferred to teach details of 
little use regarding the history of the art of war from earlier periods, as 
the approach to more significant recent conflicts remained superficial.26 
For this reason, in teaching subjects related to pre-1914 military history, 
the academy focused, above all, on four recent armed conflicts, in which 
students were expected to be familiar, right down to their intricacies.27
In this connection it is important to note that the French model of 
military education, which was used as a model by Reek in the 1920s, was 
criticized by member of the War of Independence History Committee 
Major Oskar Jalajas. He defended a diploma thesis in the KSK,28 but his 
ideas also reached a wider audience through articles in the magazine 
24 Piirimäe, “Preparing for war,” 132–135, 129.
25 Kirill Mereckov (Кирилл Мерецков), Na službe narodu (На службе народу) (Moskva: Ast, 
2003), 12–13.
26 For example, Lt. Gen. Gleb Vannovski, who later served as lecturer at the Estonian general 
staff courses, clearly underestimated Japanese military strengths before the war, for which he 
was heavily criticised later, Nadežda Brinjuk (comp.) (Надежда Бринюк (сост.), Nikolaevskaja 
Akademija General'nogo Štaba 1832–1918 (Николаевская Академия Генерального Штаба 
1832–1918) (St. Petersburg: Dmitrij Bulanin, 2018), 198.
27 Ibid., 74–75.
28 Oskar Jalajas, “Sõjakunstiajaloo ja sõjaajaloo uurimise tähtsus ja meetodid” (Kõrgema Sõja-
kooli lõputöö, 1929), RA, ERA.2124.3.268.
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Sõdur,  drawing the attention of senior Estonian officers such as Major 
General August Traksmaa.29 In addition, the War of Independence His-
tory Committee adopted Jalajas’s thesis for use in the field of methodolo-
gy.30
In his thesis, Jalajas clearly cited the advantages of learning from 
German and Soviet military history compared to the French model. Spe-
cifically, he criticized the French attitude toward military history, which 
undervalued the importance of military history in military science. There 
was lack of a desire to learn from military history, papers on military 
history were not printed – the desire to save paper was cited – and the 
practical value of military history in the changing circumstances of war-
fare was not appreciated. In general, there was the view that winners did 
not need to learn anything from history.31 Whether Estonia had a similar 
winner’s mentality due to its victory in the War of Independence, is hard 
to evaluate.
It is also difficult to say how much the crisis in French military his-
tory influenced Reek during his period of study in Paris, but some of his 
comments do contain ideas characteristic of the French School. This can 
be sensed in the abovementioned Reek’s opinion that the practical value 
of military history lay solely in the service of tactical education. At the 
same time, it must be admitted that Reek had also given a high assess-
ment to the Reichswehr’s military training and education system, due to 
which various elements from the German system were adopted in the 
Estonian military in the 1930s.32 Yet it cannot be said that Reek turned 
his back on Russian military theory entirely. For example, in his article 
Reek quoted classic Russian military thinkers such as Generalissimo 
Alexander  Suvorov, General Genrich Leer, General Mixail Dragomirov, 
Professor Colonel Alexander Neznamov and Professor Lieutenant Gen-
29 Nimmer, “Vabadussõja Ajaloo Komitee,” 19.
30 War of Independence History Committee to the VI department of the armed forces staff, 
3 September 1930, RA, ERA.495.12.531, 159.
31 Jalajas, “Sõjakunstiajaloo ja sõjaajaloo uurimise tähtsus,” 7–8. Nimmer, “Vabadussõja Aja-
loo Komitee,” 19.
32 Seene, “Eesti ohvitseride,” 46, 49, 51. Reek, Sõjateaduslik testament, 404–410. Igor Kopõtin, 
“Reichswehri identiteedikriis: selle mõjud ja kajastamine Eestis 1919–1934,” Ajalooline Ajakiri 
1 (2016): 118.
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eral Nikolai Golovin.33 Admittedly, the majority of his articles consists of 
interpretations of quotations from various leading world thinkers and of 
the evolution of military art.
Major General August Traksmaa, who also taught military history 
at the UMEI, also saw a deep crisis that arose in the mid-1920s in mili-
tary history teaching in Estonia. In his view, the factor behind this crisis 
was that, like the antecedent of the French army, the Estonian military 
command lost confidence in the military history discipline as a source 
of truth. The main problem for Traksmaa was not the winner’s mental-
ity but rather the low-quality military historical literature published en 
masse after the War of Independence.34
Reek associated the crisis in Estonian military education specifi-
cally with Russian émigrés, whom he wished to be rid of. Andres Seene 
uses the term “Reek reform” to denote the changes in Estonian mili-
tary education in 1926–1927 that followed the dismissal of the Rus-
sian émigrés. In his article, Seene indicates that Reek promoted the use 
of active teaching methods modelled on the French military at UMEI. 
These were supported by the more progressive part of the Estonian offi-
cers, including Traksmaa and Major General Juhan Tõrvand. This was 
opposed by the older generation of teaching staff, including Major Gen-
eral Dmitri Lebedev, Colonel Artur Salf and several others, who had 
called for students to memorize, word for word, lecture outlines com-
piled by the teaching staff as the Russian émigré teaching staff had done 
previously.35
The latter fact, and the conflict throughout its spectrum, can be 
seen as the influence of the processes occurring at the Nicholas General 
Staff Academy from 1905 to 1914. More precisely, following the Russo– 
Japanese War, an acute conflict broke out at that educational institution 
between teachers representing the so-called “bayonet” generation and the 
33 Nikolai Reek, “Sõjaväe sõjalise tegevuse juhatamise põhimõtted,” – Sõjateaduslik testament, 
189–190; Reek, “Korralduste andmisest sõjategevusel,” ibid., 127. Nikolai Reek, “Ühise sõjalise 
doktriini väljatöötamise tähtsus juhtide seas,” ibid., 343–352. Nikolai Reek, “Sõjaline olukord ja 
tema hindamine,” ibid., 197–198.
34 Nimmer, “Vabadussõja ajaloo komitee,” 19–20.
35 Seene, Kõrgem, 42–43.
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newer “fire” generation.36 Two giants of Russian military theory, Leer and 
Dragomirov, can be categorized among the older generation; simply put, 
they backed obsolete bayonet battle theory derived from the art of war 
in the first half of the 19th century.37 The thinkers from the older genera-
tion included, among others, the historian and professor General of the 
Infantry Nikolai Mikhnevich and Baiov, who was heavily influenced by 
the former. Baiov had to defend the entire older generation’s theoretical 
positions against strong criticism after the defeat in the war.38 Since the 
younger generation included the capable French-trained professors Niko-
lai Golovin and Alexander Neznamov, whose convictions were partially 
vindicated in the First World War, the generational debate carried over 
to Russian émigrés (Golovin) and the Red Army’s General Staff Acad-
emy (Neznamov). Among other things, the younger generation called 
for the modernization of the teaching staff ’s methods, preferring semi-
nar format to lectures and independent study to rote memorization. As a 
36 Heavy criticism was levelled against the national school of thought represented among oth-
ers by Leer and Dragomirov, who ostensibly failed to study contemporary military problems 
as they focused heavily on history. Mikhnevitch and Baiov clearly belonged to that school, see 
N. Kudrjavcev (Н. Кудрявцев), “Iskušenija russkogo polkovodčestva” (Искушения русского 
полководчества), Voennyj Sbornik (Военный Сборник) no. 4 (1913): 25–31. Mixnevitč 
argued that Russian military art was equal and even superior to the Western military art; even 
after the Russo–Turkish war of 1877–1878 he supported the bayonet over fire, Nikolaj Mixnevič 
(Николай Михневич), Osnovy russkogo voennogo iskusstva. Sravnitel'nyj očerk sostojanija 
voennogo iskusstva v Rossii i Zapadnoj Evrope v važnejšie istoričeskie èpoxi (Основы русского 
военного искусства. Сравнительный очерк состояния военного искусства в России и 
Западной Европе в важнейшие исторические эпохи) (Moskva: URSS, 2016), 136–137, 156, 
168–169.
37 Bruce W. Menning, “The Offensive Revisited. Russian Preparation for Future War, 1906–
1914,” – Reforming the Tsar's Army: Military innovation in Imperial Russia from Peter the Great 
to the Revolution, ed. David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye and Bruce W. Menning (Washing-
ton D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press with Cambridge University Press, 2004), 229. Wal-
ter Pintner, “Vene sõjaline mõtlemine: Lääne eeskuju ja Suvorovi vari,” Nüüdisaegse strateegia 
kujundajad Machiavellist tuumaajastuni, ed. Peter Paret (Tallinn: Eesti Entsüklopeedia kirjastus, 
2009), 433–437. 
38 Nadežda Brinjuk Brinûk, Èduard Koršunov, Andrej Mixajlov (Надежда Бринюк, Эдуард 
Кор шунов, Андрей Михайлов), “‘Celoe bogatstvo voennoj naučnoj mysli…’ Ob izdanii 
‘Izvestij Imperatorskoj Nikolaevskoj Voennoj Akademii”” (Целое богатство военной научной 
мысли… Об издании “Известий Императорской Николаевской Военной Академии”), 
Voenno-istoričeskij žurnal (Военно-исторический журнал), 12 (2017): 25–26.
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result, the conflict between Baiov and Reek can be placed in precisely this 
context. Furthermore, the students at the UMEI sensed characteristics 
of the bayonet warfare generation in the older teaching staff. According 
to descriptions, they demanded that their students execute a manoeuvre 
using udaletskaja taktika, švunk and armeiskaja konnitsa, in disregard of 
modern warfare tactics and the experiences of recent wars.39
While still a professor of the Nicholas General Staff Academy, Baiov 
considered the history of the art of war an important subject in military 
education. The history of the art of war was intended to help students 
understand the current situation they and their adversary were in and 
serve as the foundation for military development. Baiov saw the use 
of active teaching methods proposed by Golovin and Neznamov (and 
slightly later in Estonia, Reek) as a risk, meaning that military educa-
tion could lose scientific and formative value for military higher educa-
tion and thereby become an NCO school or regiment training squad (as 
Reek put it, a “vocational school”).40 In this light, the conflict between 
Baiov and Reek ten years after the clash between teaching staff or schools 
of thought at Nicholas General Staff Academy seems like a logical 
continuation.
Another output of Reek’s reform was preference for teaching of tac-
tics over strategy. As a result, tactics became a more important subject at 
UMEI, as other subjects were placed in a merely supporting role.41 While 
prior to reform, the main emphasis in military education was placed 
on strategy, philosophy of war and the theoretical fundamentals of the 
history of art of war, after 1926, it focused on teaching practical skills 
needed by junior officers, which allowed them to command units up to 
the company level.42 From this point on, it was possible to detect a ten-
dency to organize the entirety of the military training process on the basis 
of the “vocational school” principles mentioned above.43 The influence 
39 Veste, “Tondil,” 328. Udaletskaija taktika meant in the Russian jargon decisive infantry 
charge using bayonets.
40 Brinjuk et al., “Celoe bogatstvo,” 26.




of the German military education model can be discerned in this shift, 
as according to it, officers had to acquire knowledge they could apply in 
practice.44
By giving direction to the development of Estonian military educa-
tion between Western and Eastern warfare cultures, Reek clearly indi-
cated a preference for the West.45 Baiov, on the other hand, continuing 
in the tradition of Mikhnevich, considered Russian warfare superior to 
that of the West.46 As we will see below, this belief on the part of Baiov 
was reflected in his years-long teaching stint at UMEI. This fact was yet 
another cornerstone of a conflict between Baiov and Reek, i.e. the older 
and younger generation.
What is interesting is that Jalajas chose Baiov’s side in this conflict. 
Jalajas called the changes in Estonian military education in 1926–1927 
not an illustrious reform but rather a deep crisis, linking it with the depar-
ture of professor Aleksei Baiov. Jalajas noted that Baiov played a key role 
in teaching military history in the Estonian military, as his authority and 
influence were instrumental in the teaching of military history as a core 
subject in UMEI up to 1926. After Baiov was dismissed, the volume of 
teaching of military history subjects was reduced significantly at UMEI.47
44 Hans von Seeckt, Gedanken eines Soldaten (Leipzig: K.F. Koehler, 1935), 127. See also James 
S. Corum, Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform (Kansas: University 
Press of Kansas, 1992).
45 General Tõrvand did not think the using of Russian lecturers was “normal” but he com-
pared the situation to the practices of the University of Tartu, which – due to the lack of Esto-
nian teachers – had also hired academics from abroad. Tõrvand did not think everything was 
bad about the Russian military school, as precisely the Russian military schools had laid the 
basis for the Estonian success in the War of Independence. Tõrvand thought attacks against 
Russian emigres were associated not with concerns over teaching methods but rather with 
“nationalist xenophobia and post-revolutionary radicalism”, Tõrvand, “Rohkem objektiivsust,” 
378, 380.
46 For example, Aleksej Baiov (Алексей Баиов), “Voennoe delo v èpohu imperatora Pavla 
I. Očerk ordinarnogo professora Imperatorskoj Nikolaevskoj Voennoj Akademii Gene-
ral’nogo štaba polkovnika A.K. Baiova” (Военное дело в эпоху императора Павла I. 
Очерк ординарного профессора Императорской Николаевской Военной Академии 
Генераль ного штаба полковника А.К. Баиова), – Kap’ёv, E. (Капьёв Е.). Istorija Russkoj 
Armii (История Русской Армии). (Moskva: Izdatel’stvo È, 2016), 169. Cf. Mixnevič, Osnovy 
russkogo, 6, 9, 133–134, 155–157.
47 Jalajas, “Sõjakunstiajaloo ja sõjaajaloo uurimise tähtsus,” RA, ERA.2124.3.268, 79.
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It can be presumed that Jalajas was impressed not by Baiov as a per-
sonality but rather by the older generation as a whole, as they considered 
military history the pillar of military science. What is also noteworthy 
is that Jalajas was one of the first Estonians to interpret – and adapt for 
Estonian conditions – the ideas of the already renowned Soviet military 
theorist Alexander Svechin. In Jalajas’s interpretation of his most impor-
tant ideas, military history had fundamental importance in force genera-
tion and in military thinking. “If we do not devote enough attention to 
historical study, we can train only unskilled labourers in the military who 
are unfit for conscious invention, nor can they understand or apply rapid 
advances in military science,” said Jalajas in his interpretation of Svechin, 
speaking of the role of military history in training Estonian officers.48
In providing evidence for the need for the scientific study of military 
history, Jalajas saw military history and the history of the art of war as 
sub-disciplines of the “military history science”. The discipline of military 
history was in turn subordinate to the discipline of the history of the art 
of war, being the main source for the latter. Jalajas made no bones about 
the fact that he borrowed this hierarchy from the Russian tsarist army’s 
practice.49 But Jalajas defined the sub-disciplines of military history based 
on the German historian Ernst Bernheim’s definitions. Paraphrasing Bern-
heim, Jalajas defined military history as a branch of science that researches 
and describes the spatial and temporal development of nations and states 
or parties with a “psycho-physical” causal connection from the perspec-
tive of the values of warfare. By “psycho-physical,” he meant the object of 
research via both intangible and tangible factors; and by spatial-temporal 
development, he meant that the research had to be carried out in the con-
text of societal phenomena. Based on the general definition of military his-
tory, the discipline had to focus on the study of a specific war from the 
viewpoint of values of warfare. The history of the art of war had to focus 
on the study of all wars from the standpoint of the evolution of warfare.50
48 Oskar Jalajas, “Sõjakunstiajaloo ja sõjaajaloo uurimise tähtsus ja meetodid,” (Kõrgema Sõja-
kooli lõputöö, 1929), RA, ERA.2124.3.268, 45.
49 Jalajas, “Sõjakunstiajaloo ja sõjaajaloo uurimise tähtsus,” 18–19.
50 Ibid.,” 52–53. Nimmer, “Vabadussõja  ajaloo komitee,” 47.
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It is very likely that this view of military history and its division into 
two sub-disciplines made the passage from the Russian General Staff 
Academy to Estonian military education through Baiov in particular. 
Even as late as in a study published at the Russian General Staff Academy 
in 1912, Baiov provided a detailed overview of the development of the 
study of military history in Russia, in which he introduced its principles. 
Baiov’s description of the activity of the council headed by Count Milju-
tin in 1865 can be considered especially interesting. This council resulted 
in a definition of the nature of the study of military history, and the goals 
and methods of teaching it. It was the council that decided to divide the 
discipline into two branches – history of war as the analysis and descrip-
tion of military campaigns, and the history of the art of war, which was 
intended to study how methods of warfare changed in history from anti-
quity to modern times.51 As we can see below, these principles were also 
in force in Estonian military education until 1940.
Military history subjects at the KSK
During Professor Baiov’s time – up to 1926 – two military history subjects 
were taught at the KS: the history of the art of war and the history of the 
World War. Their volume was fairly great, as only tactics and general staff 
service subjects were even more voluminous.52 After Baiov left UMEI, 
Reek shaped the teaching of military history at the KSK. His philosophy 
was that the teaching of strategic principles at the KSK had to be based 
on teaching the history of the art of war, which had in turn to consist 
of four subjects – general history of the art of war, the World War, the 
51 Aleksej Baiov (Алексей Баиов), Istorija voennogo iskusstva, kak nauka (История военного 
искусства, как наука) (St. Petersburg: Suvorin, 1912), 7–8. This principle was later used and 
developed in the Red Army. For Soviet theorists, military history was supposed to consist of 
five elements: history of wars, history of the art of war, military organisation, history of military 
technology, and the history of military theory, Peter V. Vigor, “The Function of Military History 
in the Soviet Union,” –Transformation in Russian and Soviet Military  History, ed. Carl W. Red-
del (Washington: USAF Academy, 1990), 117.
52 Georg Leets, “Kõrgem Sõjakool 1921–1931.” Typed manuscript. RA, ERA.2124.3.588, 33.
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War of Independence and the Russian Civil War.53 In practice, however, 
only three subjects were taught, as the Russian Civil War was skipped as 
a separate subject. Thus, starting in 1927, three military history subjects 
were established at the KSK: the history of the art of war (evolution of the 
art of war), the history of the World War, and the history of the War of 
Independence.54 Since that time, the volume of military history and strat-
egy subjects was reduced to one-third of its former size.55 But in spite of 
this, military history was generally considered as one of the core subjects 
at the KSK after tactics, strategy and staff service.56 
In general, it was specifically during this time that Reek applied the 
principles of military education borrowed from France, bringing practi-
cal work methods into the study and shifting the main emphasis off strat-
egy to tactics.57 It seems that Reek’s focus on recent conflicts was under-
stood and accepted, especially among Military Academy students, who 
themselves wanted to know more about the history of the War of Inde-
pendence and the World War. As mentioned above, the issue of studying 
conflicts from recent history at the Estonian KSK may have originated 
from the Nicholas General Staff Academy. In comparison, we can bring 
the fact that the same kind of question arose in the early years in the Red 
Army General Staff: what conflicts to teach and in what volume. Whereas 
the old-school teachers preferred to focus on the earlier history of the art 
of war, students were always keen on studying the history of the Russian 
Civil War and the history of the World War.58 It was the later study and 
analysis of these two conflicts at the Red Army General Staff and Frunze 
Academy that became the basis of the renowned deep operation theory.59 
When the Red Army General Staff Academy was reopened in 1936, the 
53 Nikolai Reek, “Meie kaitseväe juhtiva koosseisu – ohvitseride kasvatuse ja väljaõppe alalt,” 
Sõdur 26/27 (1926): 553. Seene, Kõrgem Sõjakool, 37.
54 Leets, “Kõrgem Sõjakool,” 64–65. Exam protocol, September 1936, RA, ERA.650.1.1734, 55.
55 Leets, “Kõrgem Sõjakool,” 64–68.
56 Seene, Kõrgem Sõjakool, 38.
57 Leets, “Kõrgem Sõjakool”, 52, 65.
58 Mereckov, Na službe narodu, 74–75. Leonid Sandalov (Леонид Сандалов), Perežitoe (Пере-
житое). (Moskva: Voenizdat, 1961), 12–13.
59 Pavel Žilin (Павел Жилин), Istorija voennogo iskusstva (История военного искусства) 
(Moskva: Voenizdat, 1986), 106–107. Frederick W. Kagan, “The Rise and Fall of Soviet 
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chair of military history was re-established also. This chair principally 
dealt with the study and teaching of 18th and 19th century history, dealing 
with the major operations of the 20th century from the Russo–Japanese 
War, the World War and the Russian Civil War and developed methodol-
ogy for teaching military history. Although older history was also taught 
in the context of the history of the art of war, the main emphasis was still 
placed on study of the World War. These principles in teaching the history 
of the art of war and military history remained in place at the Red Army 
General Staff Academy until 1940. At that time, analysis and integration 
into curricula of the experience of the Winter War and the Lake Khasan 
and Khalkhin Gol conflicts (which had recently taken place) began.60
The history of the art of war was one of the most important subjects at 
the KSK and was taught from 1927 to 1934 by Colonel Richard Tomberg, 
commander of the air force.61 In the mid-1930s, the history of the art of 
war was taught under the name “evolution of the art of war” (for second 
year cadets) and its volume was 20 hours of lectures and two hours of 
practical assignments. In the opening lecture, Tomberg intended to dis-
cuss the importance of the evolution of military history and the art of war, 
and the methodologies and sources for its study. Thereafter, his lessons 
were to deal with various topics from ancient history to the early 20th cen-
tury. The range of topics was broad and included a brief overview of the 
development of warfare in ancient times, knights’ forces and mercenaries 
in medieval times, the reforms of Louis XIV, and the art of war of Peter 
the Great, Frederick the Great and Napoleon, and the French Revolu-
tion. The topics that dealt with the history of the art of war in the 19th 
and 20th centuries were larger in volume. According to Tomberg’s plans, 
the subject was to conclude with the development of 20th century warfare 
and discussion over future.62 In connection with the fact that there were 
 Operational Art,” – The Military History of the Soviet Union, ed. Robin Higham and Frederick 
W. Kagan (Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2010), 86–87.
60 Fedot Gajvoronskij et al., (Федот Гайворонский и др.), Академия Генерального Штаба 
(Akademija General'nogo Štaba) (Moskva: Voenizdat, 1987), 33, 42–43.
61 Leets, “Kõrgem Sõjakool,” 64–65, 77–79.
62 Colonel Tomberg to KSK, March 1934, course syllabus for the Evolution of the Art of War, 
RA, ERA.650.1.1707, 36–37.
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constant attempts to decrease the volume of military history subjects at 
UMEI, the subject was entrusted in 1934 to Major Mart Haber (since 
1940 Kaerma), a fresh graduate of the KSK; he was willing to teach the 
course in a volume of only 15 hours.63
The problem of the volume of the subject at the KSK also pertained 
to the history of the World War, with Major Herbert Grabbi being named 
responsible for the subject starting in 1927.64 At first, the volume of the 
subject depended on the existence of the corresponding entrance exami-
nation, as independent study by prospective students prior to admission 
was considered important in acquiring theoretical knowledge in order to 
gain more time for practical assignments. At the same time, Grabbi found 
that the 25 hours of lectures and one independent assignment for the 
winter period contained in the syllabus was too little for passing the sub-
ject as the volume did not allow students to complete the lecture mate-
rial printed by the teaching staff in 1930. This fact forced the lecturer to 
look for a way out, making the subject more student-centred, preferring 
active study methods to the lecture format. In Grabbi’s opinion, it would 
be difficult to decide what specific topics could have been discussed in the 
context of the subject.65
Starting in 1927, the history of the War of Independence was taught 
by Lt. Col. Jaan Maide, who was replaced in 1930 by Colonel Traksmaa. 
The history of the War of Independence was different to other military 
history subjects in terms of its larger – 37-hour – volume. The subject 
was divided into two unequal parts. The first introductory part discussed 
the impact of the Russian Revolution on Estonia, while the second part 
focused directly on war events. The thematic structure of the subject was 
reminiscent of the table of contents of the history of the Estonian War 
of Independence published by the War of Independence History Com-
mittee’s working group led by Traksmaa in the late 1930s and focused 
on describing military and, partially, military-political events.66 Yet the 
volume of the War of Independence history subject decreased by an 
63 Ibid.
64 Leets, “Kõrgem Sõjakool,” 64–65, 77–79.
65 Lt-Col Grabbi to KS, March 1934, RA, ERA.650.1.1707, 83.
66 Course syllabus, the Estonian War of Independence, academic year 1934–1935, Ibid., 77.
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entire 2/3 in the late 1930s. From there on, the subject hinged on only ten 
 lectures.67
The strategy subject also had a strong connection with military his-
tory disciplines. The teacher of the subject, Maj. Gen. Herbert Brede, 
integrated strategy very closely with the history of the art of war. Dur-
ing the 1930s, the subject also encompassed the manoeuvres of Frederick 
the Great and Napoleon, the history of the general staff in the Franco– 
Prussian War and the World War, and gave an overview of the strategy 
of the three countries in the World War based on the example of Ferdi-
nand Foch, Erich Ludendorff and Conrad Hötzendorf. The volume of the 
subject was equal to one history subject, including a total of 20 hours of 
lectures and an hour of practical work.68
Even though there were attempts in the 1930s to reduce the load in 
the KSK curriculum by reducing history subjects, the military history 
disciplines were, despite their theoretical nature, represented significantly 
in the management and staff service course.69 Furthermore, it can be said 
that probably due to a need for practical examples, two subjects in the 
military history field were devoted to recently ended conflicts – the World 
War and the War of Independence. While the French school’s approach 
to military history can be discerned, it can probably be explained by the 
fact that the predominant majority of teaching staff who taught military 
history subjects and strategy – Reek himself and Brede, Traksmaa and 
Grabbi – had obtained their own military education in France, where 
they presumably adopted French army beliefs and views on issues con-
cerning military science, strategy and military history.
67 Course syllabus, the Estonian War of Independence, undated but probably 1935, RA, 
ERA.495.12.574, 990–991.
68 Course syllabus, Strategy, probably 1935, ibid., 985.
69 Situation with courses on 1 February 1935, RA, ERA.650.1.1706, 66.
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Military history subjects in the Military Academy
How was the teaching of military history structured in other subsidiary 
institutions of the UMEI where lower-level leadership personnel were 
educated? What principles was it based on and what share in the cur-
riculum did military history subjects comprise in the Military Academy 
(henceforth SK) and the Military Technical School (henceforth STK)?
Statistics on the distribution of UMEI subjects in the years 1925–1926 
show that 16 military subjects and 20 general subjects were taught in the 
SK’s officers and cadets’ class. By volume, the history of the art of war 
came second after practical tactics and made up 10 per cent of the total 
volume of the subjects in the officers’ class in the infantry area of study 
and nine per cent of the artillery area of study. In the senior and junior 
cadets’ class, the history of the art of war made up 10 to 14 per cent of the 
total curriculum volume.70 It is noteworthy that besides the history of the 
art of war, students in the officers’ class and the cadets’ general class (who 
were acquiring secondary education) could also take two history subjects 
among the general subjects. These were homeland history and general 
history – and the volume was likewise considerable.71
The history of the art of war syllabus taught by Baiov in Russian for 
the officers’ courses included 41 topics with a volume of 75 hours and dealt 
with the art of war from Ancient Greece to the 1914 battles in the First 
World War. A certain slant toward Russia can be noted in the topics of the 
art of war syllabus – for example, in shedding light on the Peter the Great 
and Napoleonic eras – although the syllabus did not cover any Russian 
art of war in the Middle Ages, and the World War topics focused only on 
battles along the Western Front.72 It is now hard to say how much the Baiov 
syllabus was cut by the administration of the UMEI, but it had several times 
fewer Russian topics than the Baiov’s lecture notes used as study material.
During the Baiov era, the history of the art of war subject at the SK 
was divided into two unequal parts. In the cadets’ junior class, Baiov 
70 UMEI curriculum, 1925–1926, RA, ERA.650.1.1668, 1.
71 Ibid.
72 Course syllabus, History of the Art of War, officers’ courses at SK, 1924–1925, RA, 
ERA.50.1.1668, 14.
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taught 10 lectures in 1924 and 1925, which encompassed topics ranging 
from Ancient Rome to the Napoleonic era.73 The subject continued in 
the senior cadets’ class with 25 lectures, of which one-third were devoted 
to the operations in the first year of the World War on the Baltic Sea. 
The course started with Napoleon’s campaigns and included a few of the 
more famous wars of the 19th and 20th century, which Baiov apparently 
taught following Mikhnevich’s textbook.74 There were many examination 
questions and they required a very thorough knowledge of the subject in 
regard to different armed conflicts.75 On the basis of these, we can pre-
sume that students had to memorize facts in order to pass the course, 
something that the UMEI administration criticized the Russian lectur-
ers for. It is interesting that the examiner may not have been Baiov, who 
taught the subject, but someone else. For instance, in 1924, the exami-
nations were accepted by Richard Tomberg,76 who was still serving as a 
captain but later took over the teaching of history of the art of war par-
tially from Baiov, and in 1927, Jaan Maide.77 It is not quite clear what the 
aim of these substitutions was, whether to check the outcomes of Baiov’s 
teaching activity or whether Tomberg and Maide were serving as Baiov’s 
assistants.
In 1924, as directed by the UMEI administration – probably by 
Reek  – Baiov’s thematic plan was cut back in both the cadets and the 
officer candidates’ class. As a result, ancient and medieval art of war were 
omitted and the course was to start with the Gustavus Adolphus era.78 In 
the officer candidates’ class, Baiov taught the history of the art of war in 
73 “Programma istorii voennogo iskusstva na 1924–25 učebnyj god” (Программа истории 
военного искусства на 1924–25 учебный год), Cadets’ younger class, RA, ERA.650.1.1668, 
192.
74 “Programma istorii voennogo iskusstva na 1924–25 učebnyj god” (Программа истории 
военного искусства на 1924–25 учебный год), Cadets’ senior class, ibid., 133. N. P. Mixnevič 
(Н. П. Михневич), Vojna meždu Germaniej i Franciej 1870–1871. Čast' 1. Ot načala vojny do 
Sedana vključitel'no (Война между Германией и Францией 1870–1871. Часть 1. От начала 
войны до Седана включительно) (St. Petersburg: Akademija General'nogo štaba, 1897).
75 Exam plan, History of the Art of War, April 1925, RA, ERA.650.1.1668, 193–196.
76 Exam plan, History of the Art of War, 1924, RA, ERA.650.1.1670, 24–27.
77 Exam plan, History of the Art of War, 1926.–1927, RA, ERA.650.1.1039, 33.
78 Course syllabus, History of the Art of War 1923–1924, RA, ERA.650.1.1670, 30.
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1925 based on an abridged syllabus in the amount of 31 lectures. The top-
ics covered were generally the same as in the cadets’ class, but the main 
emphasis was placed on the so-called decisive battles starting from the 
Ancient Rome up to the WWI battles in Flanders in 1914.79 In 1925, Baiov 
submitted the original syllabus prepared in 1922 once again to the officer 
candidates’ class. It was cut back even more, however, and the course was 
to start from the Napoleonic era. One-third of the subject was devoted to 
the events of the World War, partly by decreasing the amount of coverage 
of the Franco–Prussian and the Russo–Japanese War.80 Despite the cuts, 
the teaching of the history of the art of war also continued in subsequent 
years after the departure of Baiov, and largely according to the structure 
of the thematic plan he had proposed.81
From 1927, following Reek’s decision the older cadets’ class and offi-
cer candidates’ class at the SK began to be taught a separate subject – the 
History of World Warfare – integrated with other subjects. In teaching 
world warfare, the main emphasis was placed on operations that took 
place during the periods of manoeuvre warfare in 1914 and 1918, with 
position warfare serving merely as the “connecting link”.82 Because of this 
the officer candidates and cadets in the oldest class were required to have 
especially good knowledge of the Marne battles and the Russian inva-
sion of East Prussia.83 In War of Independence history, taught in 1927 
and 1928 by Lt. Col. Maide, the senior year cadets were required to know 
the most important battles and operations, such as the Battle of Narva, 
the Pskov and Petrograd operations, the war in northern Latvia and the 
Landeswehr War.84 Also in the 1930s, the War of Independence history 
79 “Programma istorii voennogo iskusstva na 1924–25 učebnyj god” (Программа истории 
воен ного искусства на 1924–25 учебный год), Officer candidates’ class, RA, ERA.650.1.1668, 
296.
80 Exam plan, History of the Art of War, probably edited by UMEI commander, 1925, RA, 
ERA.650.1.1668, 331–332.
81 Entrance exam plan, History of the Art of War, 1927–1928, RA, ERA.650.1.1077, 21.
82 SÜÕ Sõjakooli õppekavad. 2. osa. Kadettide õppekavad [UMEI teaching programme, 2nd 
part, cadets’ programmes] (SÜÕ: Tallinn, 1930), V–VI.
83 Cadets’ and officer candidates’ class, entrance exam plan for History of Warfare, 1927–1928, 
RA, ERA.650.1.1077, 25.
84 Entrance exam plan, War of Indepdendence, cadets’ class, 1927–1928, Ibid., 63.
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subject taught in the cadets’ class was seen primarily as a continuation of 
what was taught in the officer candidates’ class but in intensified form. 
Attention had to be devoted to individual battle periods and war events 
in connection with the political situation.85
Military history lessons, particularly WWI and the Russo–Japanese 
War, were taken into account not only in the military history subjects 
but also general tactics – but only before 1926.86 Military history was 
most integrated with military subjects in the SK classes before the UMEI 
administration began to intervene.87 After Baiov and the other Russian 
émigrés were dismissed, military history became less integrated with 
other subjects in the SK classes.88
The new UMEI cadets’ class curriculum approved in 1930 by the 
Defence Minister recategorized the military history disciplines under 
general military subjects, the function of which was not only to develop 
the student’s intellect and the general educational level, but rather, 
together with military subjects, create an integral set of knowledge and 
skills that was necessary for future officers as leaders and educators. The 
curriculum declared the military direction of the military history disci-
plines, such as the history of the art of war and the history of the World 
War. Together with other general military subjects, military history had 
to demonstrate to students that “military sciences were just a part of the 
general sciences”.89 The thesis of the curriculum that stemmed from it was 
that the evolution of military science and the art of war were closely con-
nected with general cultural development. This showed that the senior 
officers who were behind the approval of the curriculum and belonged 
to the military command had developed, by this time, a systematic and 
comprehensive understanding of military education as a whole, as well as 
the meaning of military history specifically.
Based on both official curricula and SK’s correspondence on matters 
pertaining to the organization of study, we can say that the teaching of 
85 SÜÕ Sõjakooli õppekavad. 2. osa. Kadettide õppekavad (SÜÕ: Tallinn, 1930), VI.
86 Course syllabus, general tactics, 1924, RA, ERA.650.1.1668, 270.
87 Programma taktiki pexoty na 1923–1924 učebnyj god, RA, ERA.650.1.1670, 1.
88 Entrance exam plan, infantry tactics, 1927–1928, RA, ERA.650.1.1077, 2–4.
89 SÜÕ Sõjakooli õppekavad. 2. osa. Kadettide õppekavad (SÜÕ: Tallinn, 1930), II.
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military history disciplines did not change much in the 1930s. Although 
the volume of military history subjects did decrease slightly, these sub-
jects retained the same proportion to other subjects in the cadets’ class 
curriculum. The distribution of topics was likewise unchanged. In the 
history of the art of war curriculum, much greater emphasis was placed 
on 19th century armed conflicts, highlighting the most important military 
events that had the greatest influence on the development of the art of 
war. While the history of the art of war was taken by the younger class, 
the history of the War of Independence and the history of the World War 
was taken in the senior cadets’ class.90
The distribution of military history subjects clearly shows the prin-
ciple declared by Reek in 1926, according to which the SK should focus 
on study of recent military events, as the older era had to be given only 
cursory treatment. In the same curriculum, it was recognized, probably 
on the influence of professor Baiov, that the history of the art of war was 
one of the oldest and broadest subjects at the SK. In spite of that, the cuts 
in the subjects were justified by the argument that future officers had to 
know only a minimum amount of military history events. The curricu-
lum designers deemed it important for students to be able to continue 
research into the history of art of war independently when serving as 
officers. For this purpose, the SK was tasked with inciting in the subject 
and “lead them to the sources for in-depth study of the topic.”91
The teaching of history at the STK does not deserve much attention, 
as it operated only for a few years, with long hiatuses, and the education 
provided at this institution had a clear technical slant. From 1920 to 1923, 
the STK, similarly to the SK, taught both military history and history 
for obtaining a secondary school graduation certificate. Military history 
and other military subjects were taught in daytime format, as secondary 
school subjects were taught in the evening.92 After 1936, the SK’s military 
history teacher Maj. Juhan Vermet taught the history of World War and 
the history of the art of war to third-year students at the STK. The choice 
90 Ibid., V. Distribution of SK courses, 1930, RA, ERA.650.1.298, 22.
91 SÜÕ Sõjakooli õppekavad. 2. osa. Kadettide õppekavad (SÜÕ: Tallinn, 1930), V.
92 Vassili Villemson, “Eesti Vabariigi Sõjaväe Tehnikakool 1920–1923,” KVÜÕA toimetised 6 
(2006): 59–60.
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of topics was similar to that taught at the SK – starting with the art of war 
in ancient times and ending at the Franco–Prussian War. The history of 
the World War was a continuation of the history of the art of war and 
focused on analysis of a number of battles.93 In addition, the assistant to 
the commander of the War of Independence History Committee, Cap-
tain Edmund Püss, taught the history of the War of Independence at the 
STK. The topics covered in lessons were similar to those taught at the 
SK and the KSK.94 Elements of military history could also be noted in 
other lessons in the speciality, such as explosives, ordnance and weapons 
instruction.95
Analysing the curricula of SK cadets and officer candidates, Andres 
Seene noted the tendency of history teaching in Estonia, according to 
which the selection of subjects taught at the SK and teaching methods 
had to shape a military mindset in prospective military leaders, allow-
ing him to become oriented and quickly take a decision up to company 
commander level. Nation-state ideology was considered important in 
approaching theoretical subjects; in the context of every subject, teach-
ing staff were to develop patriotism, the will to defend their country and 
a sense of duty in their classes.96 This largely determined the volume of 
military history disciplines and the corresponding goal-setting in studies. 
For example, studies were extended at the KSK in 1938 by one year and 
the new subjects added included national defence and war leadership as a 
strategic subject and Estonian history during the early medieval times.97 
This trend showed clearly that the number and volume of military history 
subjects increased at higher levels of military education. This was quite 
reasonable, as an understanding of military history was needed more 
 specifically at senior military leadership levels.
93 Victor Orav, “Eesti Vabariigi Sõjaväe Tehnikakool 1920–1923,” KVÜÕA toimetised 6 (2006): 
156, 162.
94 Ibid., 174, 176.
95 Ibid., 156–158, 174.
96 Seene, “Eesti ohvitseride,” 54.
97 Ibid., 61.
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Military history teaching staff
The first academic teaching staff member in Estonia can be considered 
to be the aforementioned Professor Baiov. From 1904 to 1914, he was a 
professor as well as manager of Nicholas General Staff Academy, being 
responsible for academy life and research. A number of his former students 
characterized Baiov as lacking talent, a boring teacher who considered 
himself an expert on the Empress Anne era (1730–1740) and not inter-
ested in modern warfare. On the other hand, he was also considered calm 
and supportive of students.98 In spite of his strong academic background 
and extensive experience, his lectures at the academy were considered 
boring. A joke about Baiov made its rounds during this time: once Baiov’s 
class awoke because of a sudden crash of something falling. It turned out 
a rat was running inside the auditorium’s ceiling, stopped to listen to 
Baiov and fell asleep, then fell down.99 It was probably his outdated, obso-
lete teaching style that encouraged Reek to look for ways of enriching the 
teaching process through active teaching methods. In spite of that fact, 
Baiov’s contribution to the development of military education in Esto-
nia should not be underestimated, especially when it comes to teaching 
military history.
Although Baiov often came under criticism for his outdated teaching 
methods and use of Russian, he was highly regarded by one student at the 
General Staff Courses, Elias Kasak. In his opinion, Baiov’s lectures were 
lively and were based on proper lecture outlines he himself had prepared. 
It can be presumed that Baiov stood out positively from other Estonian 
teaching staff due to his professionalism, as the calibre of Estonian teach-
ing staff was very low and did not meet the objectives of the General Staff 
Courses.100
98 Ganin, Zakat, 374–375. Boris Šapošnikov (Борис Шапошников), Vospominanija. Voenno-
naučnye trudy (Воспоминания. Военно-научные труды.) (Moskva: Voennoe izdatel'stvo 
minis terstva oborony SSSR, 1982), 125.
99 Ganin, Zakat, 375.
100 Kasak, Mälestusi, 167–168.
92 Igor Kopõtin
After Baiov’s departure, Jaan Maide taught the history of the art of 
war at the SK,101 Maide being a later colonel and long-serving chief of 
staff of the Defence League. At the KSK, the history of the World War was 
taught for a long while by Herbert Grabbi,102 head of the SK and presi-
dent’s senior aide de camp.
One of the most authoritative military history teachers was August 
Traksmaa, a long-serving head of department VI of the General Staff, 
leader of efforts to research the history of the War of Independence, 
promoted in 1939 to major general. The officer candidates considered 
Traksmaa to be a great authority as he published a book on the history 
of the War of Independence that the candidates read and discussed. The 
history of War of Independence subject was perhaps the one that stu-
dents viewed most “fondly”.103 Traksmaa was said to have stood out for 
the objectivity of his lectures. He was said to have also covered mistakes 
made by Estonians and his “positions were at odds with the exalting brag-
gadocio of festive speeches”. He considered moral requirements of the 
military to be important, and the might of a more powerful adversary 
had to be compensated by the strong esprit de corps and good train-
ing of the smaller military. This, he felt, had led to victory in the War 
of Independence.104
The novels written by the writer Lindsaar, a former student at SK, 
allow us to conclude that officer candidates trusted their history lectur-
ers and their lectures were convincing and motivating for the candidates. 
In addition to the lecturer on the history of the War of Independence, 
Lindsaar also praised the lecturer who taught the history of the art of 
war – this most likely being the Major General Richard Tomberg – who 
was likewise said to have cited good examples of how a small army was 
able to prevail over a larger one thanks to good moral character.105 At 
any rate, the idea, cultivated in military education, of a patriotic ideologi-
101 Course syllabus, History of the Art of War, 1930, RA, ERA.650.1.298, 27.
102 Ibid., 28.




cal narrative being preferred to military science calculations was indeed 
prominent in Estonia military thinking.106
In general, we see that the officers who taught military history subjects 
were mainly experienced senior officers of whom most attained the rank 
of major general. Despite this fact, a number of them were not trained 
as historians. Here we could cite the thesis advanced by Nimmer – that 
the officers who served on the War of Independence History Committee 
and had dealt with military history lacked good career prospects in the 
service.107 It was probably because of this that there were no military his-
torians who were professional officers with an academic degree in history. 
It is likely that the situation was better when it came to teaching military 
history as opposed to military history research because unlike the War 
of Independence History Committee, the UMEI employed authoritative 
senior officers – indeed, the military’s intellectual elite of that era – as 
military history lecturers.
The military history teaching staff at the UMEI can be deemed rela-
tively competent, at least from the military perspective. In Seene’s opinion, 
the fact that a number of UMEI teaching staff had earlier been educated 
as schoolteachers and thus were interested in pedagogical work education 
also played a significant role.108 Yet as Seene rightly notes, the UMEI suf-
fered from a shortage of teaching staff in connection with the dismissal 
of Russian lecturers that could not be compensated by the senior officers 
who returned from France. As a result, the SK staffed only two permanent 
lecturers in 1928, as only temporary staff were left to organize all provi-
sion of education at the KSK.109
The temporary teaching staff undoubtedly included specialists 
acclaimed in their field. For example, in the years 1934–1936, General 
Laidoner, among the temporary teaching staff at the KSK, had to per-
sonally teach strategy (the political, “high strategy” part). General Reek 
taught the practical side of strategy for the Estonian conditions and staff 
service. He also taught the history subject – tactics of forces in the World 
106 Piirimäe, “Preparing for War,” 131.
107 Nimmer, “Vabadussõja Ajaloo Komitee,” 19.
108 Seene, “Eesti ohvitseride,” 45.
109 Ibid., 55.
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War. The theoretical part of strategy was taught by Maj. General Brede. 
Colonel Traksmaa, who had dealt thoroughly with the subject, taught the 
War of Independence, and the evolution of the art of war was taught for 
a longer period by Gen. Tomberg. Major Mart Haber (Kaerma) taught at 
least one course, being himself a fresh graduate of the KSK.110
Despite the long-standing practice of using temporary teaching staff, 
in 1936 the UMEI administration reached the understanding that tempo-
rary lecturers were so overloaded with direct service duties that they could 
not prepare well for lessons. Their lessons were often deficient in terms of 
pedagogy. Nor could they stick to the KSK schedule, as a result of which 
cancelled classes and relocations were a chronic problem.111 This leads us 
to a key conclusion that the noble attempts to enrich studies with active 
teaching methods and making all of military education better may have 
collided with serious difficulties due to the shortage of qualified teaching 
staff. As we have seen, this problem could not be solved in the mid-1930s.
In 1936, the situation probably improved slightly when more perma-
nent teaching staff were included in the SK. At the same time, all military 
history subjects had to be taught at the SK – the history of the World 
War, the history of War of Independence and the history of the art of 
war – by just one teacher, this being Major Vermet.112 The general trend 
of having the same teaching staff teach several subjects at several UMEI 
institutions was seen since the early 1920s. This mainly pertained to SK 
and STK classes.113
Sometimes inspections of the teaching work done by the lecturer 
were conducted, but only with the permission of the chief-of-staff of the 
Defence Forces. A committee was formed to evaluate the work of teach-
ers. The committee notified the lecturer that the inspection would take 
place two days in advance. The lecturer then had to prepare a sample les-
son 45 minutes long. In the course of the inspection, the committee evalu-
ated the substantive and pedagogical side of the lesson. In the substantive 
part, the committee looked at whether the lecturer used language that was 
110 List of temporary teaching staff, SK, 1934–1936, RA, ERA.650.1.1706, 29.
111 SK activity report, 01.04.1935–31.03.1936, ibid., 153.
112 Seene, “Eesti ohvitseride,” 79.
113 Villemson, “Eesti Vabariigi Sõjaväe Tehnikakool,” 42, 60.
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understandable to the listeners and the right terms and definitions. In the 
pedagogical part, the committee looked at whether the lecturer was able 
to provide examples, draw connections between practical and historical 
examples (if it was a subject different to history), had clear diction and 
grammatically correct language and syntax, and whether the lecturer 
achieved the aims of the lesson. Three members could serve on the com-
mittee. One was a UMEI representative (generally the head of the UMEI), 
a representative from the relevant speciality from the Defence Forces staff, 
and a representative of department VI (training) on the Defence Forces 
staff.114 Unfortunately, it has not proved possible to find any of those eval-
uation reports in the archives. In any case, it can be presumed that the 
lecturers’ work was treated with full seriousness in the Estonian military.
Finally, we should discuss at greatest length the personality of Ver-
met, with regard to whom his students gave interesting but quite contra-
dictory assessments. Onetime SK cadet Rudolf Bruus considered Vermet 
one of the best teachers at the UMEI. He was said to have expressed his 
talents so interestingly that even decades later, Bruus recalled how Ver-
met had presented the battles of Cannae and Marne.115 Unfortunately, 
Bruus’ assessment of Vermet diverged completely from the rating given 
by Victor Orav, who studied at the STK in the late 1930s and remembered 
Vermet being called “Moltke”, as he was not at all a good public speaker.116 
Orav said his manner of presentation in the history of the art of war was 
dry and left his audience indifferent. Yet Orav noted that this course did 
not only discuss historical events but also analysed major battles. This 
was of greater interest to the students.117 This description and analysis 
above lead us to a key conclusion that the teaching of military history 
was often based on personality and depended greatly on the lecturer who 
taught the course and his ability to get his listeners interested.
Vermet’s view of military history and the principles followed in teach-
ing military history subjects can be determined based on a textbook he 
compiled, in the introduction to which he made a few declarative state-
114 Lecture inspection, secret report, 02.10.1935, RA, ERA.495.12.574, 214.
115 Lindsaar, …ja sõdurid laulavad, vol. 2, 63.
116 Orav, „Eesti Vabariigi Sõjaväe Tehnikakool,“ 162.
117 Ibid.
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ments. For example, Vermet saw the art of war as the ability to make 
expedient and purposeful use of forces in war. He felt that the history 
of the art of war had to cover and study the manner in which the armed 
forces in the history of various peoples had been formed, organized, pre-
pared for combat, supplied and used in combat. In addition, the history 
of the art of war had to consider the psychosocial, political, economic and 
historical factors that impacted on war. That is why Vermet, with refer-
ence to Svechin, called the history of the art of war a discipline of cultural 
history.118 Under the influence of Richard Tomberg and as interpreted by 
Vermet, the history of the art of war had to discipline the researcher’s 
intelligence, develop a perception of reality in the researcher, accustom 
them to seeing the big picture, draw connections between events and their 
causes and teach them to critically view all military history questions.119
Teaching of military history at the UMEI
In the early 1920s, the teaching methods of the SK were considered out-
dated, the method of presentation too theoretical and institutional cul-
ture as old fashioned and Russian minded. The fact that lectures were 
held in Russian exhausted the students in the long term.120 As mentioned 
earlier, the Russian émigrés were not taken seriously at the SK and a num-
ber of jokes spread among the cadets.121 But here the question comes up: 
did the methodology for teaching military history become more effective 
after the departure of professor Baiov? Andres Seene believes that practi-
cally oriented assignments began to be predominant as a result of Reek’s 
reforms. In particular, he cites the staff rides to battle grounds that took 
place in addition to tactics lessons.122 Yet it remains unclear how quickly 
these changes were introduced into military history subjects.
118 Juhan Vermet, Sõjakunsti ajalugu. 1. osa, Sõjakunsti areng vanade klassikarahvaste aja-
järgust Napoleoni ajajärgu lõpuni (Tallinn: Sõjavägede Staabi VI Osakond, 1939), XV.
119 Ibid., XVI.
120 Seene, “Eesti ohvitseride,” 42–44.
121 Peeter Lindsaar, Värska. Romaan (Lund: Eesti Kirjanike kooperatiiv, 1977), 18.
122 Seene, “Eesti ohvitseride,” 48.
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In a programmatic article on the restructuring of military educa-
tion, Reek writes that teaching staff had to apply a greater share of active 
teaching methods in teaching military history. In the history of the art 
of war and in particular, in the history of the World War and the War 
of Independence, the lecturer had to focus on a detailed description of 
the entire chain of events, not analysis of individual battles. The analysis 
had to highlight the preparation for battles, leadership in battle, use of 
equipment and cooperation between branches of the military. To teach 
the context of events, facts previously presented as text had to be visual-
ized by graphs and tables and posted on the walls of the auditorium. In 
this regard, the teaching of military history at the UMEI and in particular 
at the SK had to be completely reorganized.123
When Reek’s changes were introduced, it was decided in 1927 to 
make slight adjustments to the SK’s cadets and officer candidates’ curri-
cula. The attempt to make the curricula in the SK’s classes more practical 
became a goal unto itself. For that reason, the UMEI administration felt 
it necessary to increase the number of practical lessons and decrease the 
number of theoretical classroom hours. The necessity of formation train-
ing lessons in particular was stressed when it came to practical lessons. 
Yet the greatest achievement can be considered to be the shortening of the 
lessons from 90 minutes to 50 minutes.124
The course outlines and homework preserved by Maksim Grauer, 
who was in the cadets’ class of 1938–1939, allow a few conclusions to 
be drawn regarding studies in military history subjects. For example, 
the subject World War History followed Reek’s principle to focus on the 
manoeuvr ing stages in 1914 and 1918 as illustrated by a number of opera-
tions on the Western and Eastern fronts. On the basis of course outlines, 
we can say that a majority of the lesson was spent by lecturer Vermet talk-
ing about the course of the operation with an accuracy of specific dates, 
and the second part of the lesson gave a comprehensive assessment of 
123 Reek, “Meie kaitseväe juhtiva koosseisu kasvatuse ja väljaõppe alalt,” – Sõjateaduslik testa-
ment, 391.
124 UMEI commander’s report about SK teaching programme, 1927, RA, ERA.650.1.1077, 87. 
The tendency to increase practical subjects at the cost of theoretical subjects was also pro-
nounced at the NCO school, Seene, “Eesti ohvitseride,” 53, 55, 69.
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the events. The treatment of operations was quite detailed and included 
data on the manoeuvres that were carried out by units ranging from 
brigades to the whole army.125 In the subject history of the War of Inde-
pendence, attention was devoted – for a majority of the time in the lec-
ture hall – to analysis of battles. On one hand, there were many battles 
covered, yet analysis of the operations – which contained assessments 
of the belligerent sides’ actions and lessons learnt – allowed cadets more 
easily to connect what they learned to their own service at platoon and 
company level.126
Recollections published at various times provide reflection on the 
provision of education at UMEI. Although Lindsaar wrote fiction, his 
work reflects the atmosphere and background of events at SK to an 
important degree.127 He wrote that the relative importance of lectures was 
quite sizeable. Constant attendance of lectures at SK required unwaver-
ing attention and tired the students so that many ended up falling asleep 
on or under the bench. As the cadets knew the lecturers better than the 
officer candidates did, they knew exactly whose lectures were safe to sleep 
in. The self-respect of the lecturers prevented them from reprimanding 
the sleeping students, which led to awkward situations in the lecture hall. 
At the same time, it can also be concluded from Lindsaar’s description 
that in spite of it all, the lecturers were seen by the candidates as undis-
puted authorities because most of the lecturers had fought in the War of 
Independence.128
The subject of history met with lively interest from the officer can-
didates. Many questions and counterarguments were aired after the lec-
tures, all based on “rumours among the public”. For example, the Battle 
of Tannenberg – the Russian invasion of East Prussia – raised questions. 
The officer candidates asked follow-up questions regarding the actions 
of General Samsonov, the commander of the 2nd Army. The Battle of 
125 Ensign Maksim Grauer’s conspectus in the subject History of Warfare, 1938 or 1939, 
Museum of the Estonian Military Academy (hereafter MEMA), fond 654.1.1, unpaginated.
126 Ensign Maksim Grauer’s conspectus in War of Independence, results of battles, grades and 
lessons learned, 1938 or 1939, MEMA 654.1.2, unpaginated.
127 Seene, “Eesti ohvitseride,” 34.
128 Peeter Lindsaar, …ja sõdurid laulavad, vol. 2, 16–18, 159–160.
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A caricature illustrating 
the generational chasm 
in the history lecture 
in the 1920s Estonia: 
a professor is imagining 
the battles of the Great 
War but the effort just 
appears as a comical 
performance to listeners. 
Source: Sõdur 6–8 
(1928): 334
Tannen berg, one of the most thoroughly covered cases, was in fashion 
and was taught in both the officer candidates’ and cadets’ class.129
The lessons on the history of the War of Independence met with the 
most interest from students because many of them had personal expe-
rience and emotions connected to the war, which occurred during the 
childhood of the officer candidates and cadets. The officer candidates 
always tried to supplement the lecturer with personal recollections and 
shared impressions after the lectures. A particularly substantive discus-
sion started while cleaning rifles, when the officer candidates had time 
to recall moments from the War of Independence, experiences they lived 
through, communist atrocities witnessed, finding themselves amidst the 
fighting, or some remembered song.130
129 Lindsaar, …ja sõdurid laulavad, 160–162, 231.
130 Ibid., 161.
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A characteristic non-formal way of teaching military history was sto-
rytelling around the campfire at training camp (so-called Southern Camp 
near Petseri). Lindsaar describes how a colonel had recalled his service 
in the Russian army and participation in WWI and the officer candidates 
gathered around and listened attentively.131 Through this activity, teach-
ing staff became closer to the students and probably gained even greater 
authority.
The writer Karl Ehrmann (Eerme) described in a work of fiction pub-
lished in 1930, Sõdurite elu (The Life of Soldiers), the service performed 
by officer candidates at the SK in 1928. Just like Lindsaar’s work, so, too, 
was the Life of Soldiers autobiographical and related to the author’s own 
personal experience as a conscript in the Estonian military. As for his 
service in the SK, which he called a “monster hell”, he noted that it was 
the most interesting time of his service. Similar to Lindsaar, he described 
the emotions of the officer candidates and noted that the studies were 
organized very well. Still, while Ehrmann said that all conscripts had high 
enthusiasm for studies when they entered the officer candidates’ class, 
they learned how to slack off once they got used to the new conditions. 
He noted that the studies were predominantly theoretical and consisted 
mainly of lectures, which made some of the officer candidates more indif-
ferent and laxer. After a time, the officer candidates had waved dismis-
sively at the “lecturers’ pathetic explanations as to how warfare was con-
ducted in Rome” and what they heard in lecture went “in one ear and out 
the other”.132
Reek’s suggestions for changes seemed sensible and appropriate 
compared to the Russian older generation’s teaching practices. But even 
though Reek called for use of active teaching methods as early as 1926, 
the situation had not changed even by 1936 and lectures were still the 
predominant format of study. Changes in the didactic approach in the 
teaching of military history became more noticeable at UMEI starting 
from the 1936/1937 academic year, when the UMEI activity report noted 
that for the first time, the emphasis in the teaching of military history 
131 Lindsaar, …ja sõdurid laulavad, 245–246.
132 Karl Ehrmann, Sõdurite elu (Võru: Tähe, 1930), 245.
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was shifted to independent research by students and presentation of their 
findings.133 This probably meant that the studies were becoming student-
centred.
Considering this, it can be presumed that things had indeed changed 
by the latter half of the 1930s. Thus, the recollections of Rudolf Bruus, 
who studied at the SK from 1934 to 1938 were particularly significant. 
Bruus recalled that the students called the two-storey outbuilding built 
for lectures at Tondi a “sleep castle”.134 This probably referred to the fact 
that the theoretical teaching methodology was still one-dimensional, and 
the presentation style was dry and unappealing to the students. Yet Bruus 
acknowledged that the military history subjects – the history of the art 
133 UMEI activity report, 01.04.1936–31.03.1937, RA, ERA.650.1.524, 58.
134 Rudolf Bruus, “Mälestusi Eesti Vabariigi sõjakoolist 1934–1938,” –Mälestusi Eesti Vabariigi 
sõjakoolist, ed. Valdur Talts (Tallinn: Eesti Riigikaitse Akadeemia, 1996), 56.
History of the War of Independence was popular among the cadets: here, 
would-be officers are preparing for Independence War exams at the Officers’ 
School at Tondi, Tallinn, in 1936. Courtesy: Museum of the Estonian Military 
Academy
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of war, the World War and the War of Independence – were among the 
most fascinating subjects at the SK. As mentioned above, Bruus associ-
ated good teaching of military history subjects with the personality traits 
of the lecturer who taught them.135
A rather interesting practice in the teaching of military history at 
UMEI can be considered to be the independent preparations on the part 
of students before tackling the course material. Students entering the KS 
were required to have thorough basic theoretical knowledge in military 
history, which was supposed to lay a factual groundwork for the subjects. 
This allowed the teaching staff to focus more on substantive discussions 
during the time in the lecture hall.136 What is noteworthy is that in 1930, 
prospective students were recommended to read at least three books in 
the field of military history in preparing for entrance exams: Svechin’s 
Istorija vojennago iskusstva, Delbrück’s Geschichte der Kriegskunst and 
Professor Baiov’s Istoria vojennago iskusstva.137 At the entrance exams in 
military history, the candidate was required to know the most important 
historical events and to possess a broad understanding of the importance 
of individual events and their influence in the general historical context 
and the ability to draw conclusions from history.138
Based on the practice described above, and taking into account the 
heavy subject volume at that time, Grabbi made a proposal in 1934 to 
make the history of World War more learner-centred at the KSK and let 
the students prepare oral presentations on the basis of the existing mate-
rial. Grabbi felt such a teaching method would develop students’ learning 
ability and speaking skills and that it would also “broaden knowledge of 
history”. Grabbi believed that the 10 lessons called for in the second year 
of study could be furnished with two case studies – he proposed the Battle 
of the Ardennes in August 1914 and/or the 1915 winter Second Battle 
of the Masurian Lakes. To prepare the case studies, Grabbi asked that 
teaching staff be relieved completely of other duties.139 It is evident that 
135 Ibid., 63.
136 Lt. Col. Grabbi to KSK, March 1934, RA, ERA.650.1.1707, 83. See also the chapter on exams.
137 Books that may be used at entrance examinations at KSK, 1934, RA, ERA.650.1.1706, 17.
138 Entrance requirements at KSK, 1934, ibid., 18.
139 Lt. Col. Grabbi to KSK, March 1934, RA, ERA.650.1.1707, 83.
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such case studies incited lively interest among the students. In addition, it 
can be presumed on the basis of the above facts that the use of the active 
study methods launched by Reek encouraged faster progress, above all, at 
the KSK and then in the SK classes. In any case, it took no less than eight 
years to realize Reek’s vision.
One output of the active teaching methods was the requirement that 
students at the KSK work through and prepare presentations on the his-
tory of the World War in one specific battle for the case study planned in 
the second year of study. The Battle of the Ardennes (21–25 August 1914) 
was picked as the case study in 1934 at the KSK.140 It is not completely 
clear why this battle – part of the so-called Grenzschlachten, the Battle 
of the Frontiers – was chosen.141 It can be presumed that this battle was 
intended to highlight elements of manoeuvre warfare, which character-
ized the first battles of the First World War. At the same time, there were 
other examples from World War where manoeuvres were attempted on 
both the Western and Eastern Front. The display of preference for the 
French experience of warfare likely alludes to the fashion in the latter half 
of the 1920s and the influence of French military education.
The case study was divided into two practical sections. Part A devoted 
thorough analysis to the strategic and operational aspects of the Battle of 
the Ardennes, and part B examined the operational and tactical aspects. 
A general description of the battlefield was provided at the outset, intro-
ducing the belligerent parties and the preparation for the operation, and 
the high command’s directives were enumerated, along with tasks for the 
armies and corps. Then, the situation was run through at the corps, divi-
sion and regiment level. The battle orders for the action of 22 August 
1914 was introduced in detail at the division and regiment level. The case 
study concluded with drawing of conclusions in regard to engagement 
and the “reasons for the Germans’ tactical success”.142 On the basis of 
some  recollections, it can be concluded that the analysis of major battles 
140 Course syllabus, World War, 1934, ibid., 84.
141 Ivan Rostunov (Иван Ростунов), Istorija Pervoj Mirovoj vojny 1914–1918, vol. 1 (История 
Первой Мировой войны 1914–1918. Т. 1.) (Moskva: Institut voennoj istorii ministerstva obo-
rony SSSR, i-vo Nauka, 1975), 282–283.
142 Course syllabus, World War, 1934, RA, ERA.650.1.1707, 85.
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were of greater interest to students in the 1930s than ordinary theoretical 
 lectures.143
An additional outlet for teaching military history was the thematic 
final theses on military history written by students at the KSK. On the 
basis of the UMEI documentation of teaching activity, it can be concluded 
that great attention began to be devoted to the selection of topics for KSK 
theses and the principles for writing the theses. In 1933, guidelines for 
writing final theses were drafted for the KSK, being approved personally 
by the chief of staff Maj. Gen. Tõrvand. Among other things, these guide-
lines set out that final theses in military history did not have to include 
a practical part. The researchers writing on military history topics were 
required to draw “summaries of these conclusions and lessons learned 
which merit attention from the standpoint of modern warfare above all 
in our conditions”.144
How much was written on military history topics at KSK? During the 
first to fifth class of the KSK, a total of eight theses of 64 were on military 
history topics (12 per cent). The battles of the Estonian War of Indepen-
dence and World War were primarily covered. In addition, topics from 
the art of war were rather popular. In general, it appears that military his-
tory aspects were incorporated into nearly all KSK final theses.145 During 
the sixth graduating class, four military history topics were added (there 
were a total of 29 final theses that year).146 On one hand, this is indicative 
of low interest in history, but on the other hand, it shows some growth of 
interest.
Of the 31 final theses in 1936, 11 (35%) were written on military his-
tory. All of the topics were related to the lessons learnt from the World 
War and the War of Independence in the fields of tactical and operational 
art, supply of forces and use of different types of weaponry.147 We can 
presume that the interest of KSK students in military history topics was 
much higher than it had been in years past.
143 Orav, “Eesti Vabariigi Sõjaväe Tehnikakool,” 162.
144 Guidelines for compiling KSK final theses, RA, ERA.650.1.1706, 8.
145 KSK I, II, III, IV, list of final theses, the 5th Class, 1933, ibid., 1–5.
146 KSK list of final theses, the 6th Class, 30.03.1933, Ibid., 6–7.
147 KSK list of the topics of final theses, the 7th Class, 08.02.1936, ibid., 141–143.
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The topics of final theses written at Latvian military academy were 
examined carefully at KSK. In the early 1930s, these included a notewor-
thy number of history topics (about 30%). The writing was intertwined 
with strategy, operational art, and the sociology and psychology of war. It 
is interesting that the history topics chosen in Estonia were constrained to 
20th century conflicts, mainly WWI and the War of Independence, while 
in Latvia some dissertations were in the field of 19th and even 18th century 
military history. One thesis was even devoted to cooperation between 
Estonia and Latvia in the case of a potential conflict with Russia.148
Knowledge of military history, above all the War of Independence 
experience, was used in the KSK for tactical excursions by officers to 
potential future battlefields – as the high command envisioned it, these 
were the border areas of the Republic of Estonia.149 For example, in sum-
mer 1935, the KSK organized three tactical staff rides to strategic areas, 
which coincided with the areas where the 2nd Division had fought during 
the War of Independence – Irboska and vicinity, Laura and vicinity and 
the Vastseliina and Petseri areas.150 Victor Orav, who studied at the STK 
from 1936, mentioned excursions to battlefields in Jõelähtme, Aegviidu, 
Tapa, Riigiküla and Narva. Unfortunately, the participant remembered 
only the entertainment aspect of the military history outings.151
The UMEI’s experience in organizing excursions was also offered for 
use to military units. In 1935, the commander of the 2nd Division, Colo-
nel Traksmaa (who had been engaged in the study of the War of Inde-
pendence) proposed to Commander-in-Chief Laidoner that excursions 
to the War of Independence battlefields be organized for the 2nd Division 
units on the model of the KSK. The objective of the excursions was to get 
to know the history of military units. The excursions had to be conducted 
at the expense of officers’ and NCOs’ associations and during their free 
148 Kara akademisko kursu diplomdarbu saraksta, undated but probably 1933 or 1934, ibid., 
11–15.
149 Piirimäe, “Preparing for War,” 133. KSK correspondence, August 1935, RA, ERA.650.1.1715, 
291.
150 Commander of UMEI to the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, 28 June 1935, 
RA, ERA.495.12.574, 781.
151 Orav, “Eesti Vabariigi Sõjaväe Tehnikakool,” 148–154.
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time – at weekends. The professional cadre of each unit and a few reserve 
officers had to take part in these outings. During the excursions, presen-
tations had to be delivered at the battlefields. Laidoner wrote “agreed” 
as his decision on the proposal, apparently concurring with Traksmaa 
that “military history excursions hold great importance in training our 
Defence Forces cadre”.152 The geography of the military history excur-
sions proposed by Traksmaa was covered places in Petseri County, Võru 
County, Tartu County and Viru County.153
Conclusions
In conclusion, we can say that the teaching of military history disciplines 
played a noteworthy role in Estonian military education. The foundation 
for this was laid by a Russian émigré teacher, the onetime professor of 
the Russian General Staff Academy, Aleksei Baiov. It is also important to 
consider changes proposed by Nikolai Reek pertaining to the teaching 
of military history. As a result of Reek’s activities, military history disci-
plines and their content were reshaped, military history assignments were 
set out and the relationship between military history and other branches 
of military science were clarified, subjecting military history to the needs 
of tactical training.
In founding Estonia’s military education system, Reek was forced to 
use Baiov, like other Russian émigré teaching staff, as ethnic Estonian spe-
cialists in this area were still scarce. Despite the fact that Baiov was invited 
by Reek, a conflict between Baiov and Reek quickly emerged. Although 
these figures in the military sphere had different academic aptitude and 
calibre, the conflict can be seen as the legacy of the onetime Nicholas 
General Staff Academy. On one hand, Baiov stood out in Estonia for his 
professionalism, but on the other hand, he represented the older gen-
eration of Russian military theorists. A positive aspect is the systematic 
152 The commander of the 2nd Division Colonel Traksmaa to Commander-in-Chief Laidoner, 
03.04.–06.04.1935, RA, ERA.495.12.574, 4.
153 Plan of historical staff rides, 2nd Division, 16.04.1935, ibid., 5.
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research into and teaching of military history, which was valued by that 
generation; a negative aspect was that it was relatively unconnected with 
modern warfare. It can perhaps even be said that Reek played the role of 
the progressive of the younger generation of Russian military theorists, as 
he saw a fundamental need to modernize military history and the teach-
ing of military history. In the opinion of Reek, this had to focus more on 
the study and teaching of modern armed conflicts as the history of the 
art of war in earlier times was supposed to merely establish the needed 
context for the knowledge.
One of the progressive decisions made by Reek was to modernize the 
teaching of military history through the use of active methods, engaging 
more with the audience. He thus preferred analysis of military history to 
mere factual knowledge. Still, military history continued to be taught in 
a lecture format up to the mid-1930s, as not enough resources were allo-
cated to students’ independent and group analytical work. In addition, 
the teaching of military history depended on the lecturer’s individual 
ability to make the subject attractive to students.
The UMEI took a serious attitude toward military history subjects, as 
its teachers, especially in the KSK, were generally recognized senior Esto-
nian officers who made up the intellectual elite in the Estonian military. 
Even though some of them had had earlier experience with school peda-
gogy, none was an historian by training. This fact could have also made it 
more complicated to plan and carry out teaching activity, to say nothing 
of developing a conception of the need for military history. Development 
of military history competency was, among other things, rendered dif-
ficult because unlike active duty, military history was not considered a 
promising area for an officer making a career. Thus, the teaching of mili-
tary history remained more of a hobby for senior officers.
In general, we can draw a conclusion that regardless of the criticism, 
the volume of military history subjects in the UMEI did not change over 
the years. However, the distribution of military history subjects did change. 
Now it is clear that the principles for teaching military history disciplines 
were also shaped by Baiov. Although Reek took a stance against Baiov, he 
did not succeed in changing the principles for teaching the military his-
tory disciplines. It can be said that Baiov’s – i.e. concepts and frameworks 
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developed at the Nicholas General Staff Academy – remained generally 
salient until the disbanding of the Estonian military in 1940. A positive 
outcome of Reek’s work can be considered to be the teaching of the histo-
ries of two then recently ended conflicts – the World War and the War of 
Independence – as separate subjects. Thus, the division of the art of war 
into three subjects did not change the overall volume of military history 
in the curriculum but it did raise the share of contemporary conflicts in it.
In the future, it is worth considering the question of teaching of and 
research into military history in the context of Estonian military plan-
ning to better understand the influence it imparted on military planning. 
Compared to the development of other militaries in Europe, it could be 
determined how unique the problem of teaching military history was in 
Estonian military education during the interwar period. A brief digres-
sion into the teaching of military history in the Red Army shows that the 
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